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CHAPTER

^

I

INTRODUCTION

ProfesBor Laskl has been one of the most controversial
figures In the history of

modem political

theory.

His

which dealt with the problems he actually had faced
ranged over wide areas embracing pluralism, Fabianism, and

Marxist socialism.

As an able biographer has put It, ”he

was Interested In the history of political Ideas and relations
of current events and the problems to a theory of government.**^

Laskl

*B

Influence as

a

teacher on the minds of young students

In England and iimerlca, as well as of those from Afro-Aslan

countries seems to have been great Indeed.

During the fifty-seven years of his life (1893-1950)
Laskl witnessed the tragic drama of two world wars.
the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.

of Democracy after World War

,I

He saw

He observed how the triumph

was soon challenged by the

rising menace of Nazism In the Continental Europe.

He also

experienced the Great Depression of 1930s, and the accompanying misery of the mass of people, which seems to have aroused

his sense of Justice against the prevailing social injustice.
All such historical Incidents could not escape the per-

ceptive mind of Harold Laskl without challenging him to fight
for the preservation of Individual freedom against the en-

croaching totalitarian philosophy, and for the promotion of

^Kingsley Martin, Harold Laskl (New York:
Press, 1963), p. 44.

The Viking
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Individual happlnesa by providing the neoeeaary political,
social, and economic conditions.

Since most of Laski'a

writings had direct bearings on contemporary world affairs,
it would be desirable to understand the historical back-

ground behind the particular political ideas of Laskl.

How-

ever the task of understanding such background would have to
be loft largely to each reader of this paper.

Democracy is, today, challenged by another form of totalitarian philoso{^y.

Often it has been questioned, especially

among young intellectuals, whether the democratic philosophy
could survive this serious challenge.

It is the opini<^ of

the writer of this paper that democracy as i^ilosophy has

reached low ebb today due to the two decades of repose prior
to World War II, and it is necessary to revive the principle
of democracy as a philosophy in order to meet the new chal-

lenge successfully.
In this context, I would like to analyze the political

ideas of Professor iaski, whose early writings dealt mainly

with the problems of democracy.

Hence, this paper is primarily

focused on the years between 1914 and 1951.

During this

period Laskl was a strong exponent of the cause of libera-

lism and individualism.

However, In order to show the politi-

cal philosophy of Laskl in

a

fuller picture, one chapter is

devoted to the discussion of Laskl as
after 1932

a

near-Marxian socialist

3

Harold J. Laski was

bom

son ot Nathan and Sarah Laakl*

cotton shipper and
city of Manchester*

s

on June 30, 1893 as the second

His father was a prosperous

leader of the Jewish community In the
It Is said that the young Laskl as a

boy experienced Inner conflict between his liberal sentiment

and a strict Judaic dogma*

This religious upbringing seems

1

to have played an Important role In the formation of his

character and future outlook*

Judaism Is, In

a sense, a way

of life directed toward a sense of Messianic mission*

"Con-

scious from his youth that his Jewishness set him apart from
the main stream of his society, he felt a strong Impi^lse to

become the ally of ell those vdiose want. Ignorance, and misery

were hidden behind the placid facade of the Victorian era,
and who could be therefore Ignored by the successful and oon-

tented*

„2

It would not be too much to say that Laskl *s pre-

cocity In Intellectual development was largely due to the
Judaic tradition of early training which could well have helped his amazing power of memory and argumentative quickness*
In 1910 Laskl won a scholarship at New College, Oxford*
iit

this time he was still Interested In the field of biology,

especially in eugenics. In which he displayed
talent In a short period of learning*

a

remarkable

The following year

Laskl sedretly married Frida Kerry, a gentile*

fthen the

mar-

^Herbert A* Deane, The Political Ideas of H arold J* Laskl
Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 6.
(New York:
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rlage was discovered by his parents, they did not permit him
to live with his newly wedded wife for his three remaining

years at Oxford*

However, the marriage was a happy one for

both of them, since they married not only because they loved,
but also hoped together to pursue common Ideals of human re-

generation*

After Laskl moved to Oxford, his Interest began to turn
to the field of history^

In his formative years, he studied

under such celebrated teachers as Sir Paul Vlgnogradoff , Professor of Jurisprudence; Sir Ernest Barker; Herbert Albert
Laurens Plsher, who lectured In history; end Frederic ttllllam

Maitland, legal historian.

The Influence of Maitland especial-

ly was great to Laskl in providing him with the basis of

pluralism*

Laskl also joined the ranks of the Fabian Society

at this period, but his action and philosophy were rather

moderate than militant*

This basic temper remained with him

throughout his life, and even after he identified himself as
a

Marxist after 1932 his belief was in a revolution by consent

idilch would

not sacrifice the Western democratic tradition.

In 1914, upon finishing his finals at Oxford, he accepted

for the lallX
an Invitation by George Lansbury to work
a labor publication*

He wrote many articles on behalf of the

labor movement during this time*

^Martin, op* clt *, p* 17

Whe World Aer I began, his

6

attempt to enlist failed on medical grcunds.

then ac-

cepted an Invitation to lecture at hcOlll University In
Itontreal and soon his life on the iimerlcan continent began*

After

brief stay at koulll University, Laskl was ap-

a

pointed as an Inatnicter at Harvard University In 1916.

dy

1918 his scholarship waa widely recognized end his foundation
was set firmly In the academic world.

Beside tutoring at

Harvard, Laskl devoted much of his time to the study of law,

which contributed later to his analysis of the nature of
sovereignty.

Liberal as he was, and as he alweys tried to relate his

theory to actual problems, he could not stay aloof in the

Boston Police strike of 1919.
expressed his sympathy for

Luring the strike, he candidly

tliose

The consequence

who protested.

of his stand and experience during the strike were of great

Importance in molding a new outlook In his pi-illoaophy .

He

saw how the propertied class united to defend Its Interests

even by employing force, and how the legal system in capitalist

society worked for the vested Interest.

"In short, Harold

discovered at first hand the weakness of the liberal philosophy In which he had been brought up end took

a

long step

towards a predcmlnantly Marxist view, the examination and

elaboration of which was to be the principal substance of his
future thinking.

^Ibld.

,

„4

p. 37.
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In the fiummer of 19£;0, JUskl returned to London to tc-

cept a teaching poaltlon at the London School of Economics.
This,

was the period during which

nyany

liberal e ware facing

unprecedented challenges; Laski found many people unemployed
in the midst of economic depression.

cracy

shaken by the challenge of

The foundation of demoa

totalitarian philosophy.

And the next decade ended in failure in achieving any genuine

allience between the

ifcest

and Soviet Russia to defend them-

selves against the threat of Hasi egression.

It was in the

early 19^0s that Laski began to turn to practical politics
and began to be interested in economics.

Vihen the Great De-

pression of 1929 hit the world with an unprecedented blow,
he began to concede the weakness of pluralism as a means of

realizing

a

just society, oecause pluralism failed to provide

a strong central authority? which could carry out basic social

reform.
The defection of Ramsey fcacLonald convinced Laski that

social revolution thi-ough Parllainentary measures was
ficult, if not impossible, task.

a

dif-

After this incident, the

left wing of the Labor Party, including Laski himself, gave

up its traditional optimism and ciianged to a more militant

outlook in social reform,

after that Laski engaged in party

politics more actively while teaching

School of Economics.

at

the same time in the

It was his deep conviction that academic

theory must be related to practical politics.

This

w'as

also

7

said to be the founding philosophy of the School of hcono-

mlcs •
Luring

rtorld War II,

Laskl saw an opportunity for

revolution by consent, since, according to him,

a

a

war general*

ly brings a great Intermingling of the class and property

relations*

Thus during the war, he continuously emphasized

the need for a new social order in the post-war period and
not to return to the old order.
In 1942,

at the annual party conference In London Laskl

said in part, ”the age of competitive capitalism is over.
A democracy means nothing mox« than a society of equals plan-

ning production for community consumption.’*^ This view was
a

considerable change from his earlier philosophy, but one

should not make

Marxist.

a

hasty judgment of labeling him an orthodox

For example, Laskl looked to ^resident Roosevelt,

not Stalin, for the realization of just society in post-war
world.

Thus when Liski heard the news of Roosevelt’s death,

he wrote to Justice Frankfurter in part, "this is a blow

almost beyond words.

If you know how much 1 had counted on

him for the first years

of peace..."

be too much to say that he was

a

From this, it would not

liberal democrat, at least

in the method he wished to employ to realize the egalitarian

society he had In his mind.

^ Ibld

.,

p.

154.

^Ibld., p. 158.

Laskl did not approve the Russian

8

authoritarianism, but he was rather generous to Kussla in
the sense that he urged us to see the revolution in a longer

historical perspective,

^ie

viewed the Russian revolution as

an Inheritor of the French Revolution and he hoped liberty

would prevail in future years.
In the American scene, Laski emphasized the need for the

birth of
England.

a

labor party similar to that which existed in
What he wanted was to bring American political

parties to a closer alignment to their ideological base.

Laski believed that the two parties in America were both conservative in their nature, and unable to represent the real

Interests of the working class.

OHiiPlER II

THE NiiTUhE OF THE STiiTE
l4i8lci*B i.ttaok on

the

Monlstlo Theory of State
The monistic theory of the state came under the severe

criticism of Laski.

His early writings were primarily direct-

ed to attack the monistic theory.

To him this theory

against the basic principle of liberal tradition.

wiis

Monlsts

in general viewed society as a single unit in which individual

members have meaning only In relation to the whole.

Such

a

view of a state thus contained the possibility of Justifying
the absolute obedience of the people to the state under the

name of unity.

within

a

Although the existence of numerous groups

society might be recognized, their interests should

be subordinated to that of the state for the purpose of main-

taining social order and harmony.
The origin of this philosophy could be traced back as
far as the Oreek Polls, when Plato expounded the existence of

absolute idea, and when Aristotle wrote of the supreme power
Hence, it could be said that the seeds for

of the state.

the emergence of Leviathan state were sown already twentyfive centuries ago.

This basic idea was inherited by the

Roman Republic and Empire. It was again inherited by such men
^bes in modern times, and the very philosophy
as bodln and Hobv
became the midwife, in large degree, at the birth of the
,

modem nation

state.
9

10

It Is necessary to discuss the philosophical founda-

tion of the monistic theory of the state In order to understand what Laokl was attacking, and whore It was that he

departed from this monism In developing his Ideqs of pluralism.
As mentioned briefly above, the origin of the monistic theory

of state was found In the Idealism of Plato.

The essence of

Platonic Idealism was Its acceptance of the absolute

Ideei

which was perfect and the model of everything that ought to
be, as an autonomous reality.

Plato believed In the existence

of a complete and perfect universe which embodied the perfect

state.

This metaphysical Ideal was more real than that which

we could perceive through our senses.

To Plato this eternal

Idea was the thought of god.

Plato also derived the concept of the organic view of

society, where order, harmony, and unity prevail, from the

experience of the Greek city state.

Due to Its small size

and the relatively simple nature of Its political and economic

structure, and also due to the comparatively homogeneous nature
of the Interests of Its citizen, the city-state demonstrated

sufficiently the desirability of order and harmony In unity.
Hegel later shared a similar belief In the existence of
the Idea of absolute.

Thus Hegel argued that we were all

had meaning
parts of this absolute whole and each Individual

namely the
only within the context of this organic whole,
the
Since he beatified the state to such a degree,
state.
the state as
Inherent logic seems to have led him to regard

11

an end In Itself rather than the means to realize Individual

happiness.

Such a logical deduction was derived from meta-

physical assumptions (which Laskl of course rejected) such
as,

(1)

parts,

the whole Is greater than the sum of the Individual
(2)

the whole is prior to the parts, and

is more real than the parts.

(3)

the whole

Laskl rejected the Idealism

which was based on such metaphysical assumptions on the ground
that It never enabled us to come to grips with facts.

Laskl

's

In

opinion, those Idealists thought so largely in terms

of a beneficent teleology to soften the distinction between

political oppositions',

idealism beatified the status quo by

regarding each element as an integral part of

a

process, which

it insisted on viewing as a totality.

The organic view of society led even

a

man like Rousseau,

who was extremely liberal in his early thinking, to accept

totalitarian philosophy.

His concept of the General Will

became a seedbed, in later days, for the growth of totali-

tarian philosophy, because obedience of individuals to the

General Will, whatever it may be, was required even by use
of coercive means.

Obviously, when the conformity to a

certain view was required by the state (which is comprised
of small group of persons) by the use of force if necessary,
the concept of the General Will becomes authoritarian in its

nature.
Laskl rejected this concept of General Will on the
ground that, first of all, "if if'means that right must prevail,

18

it dwells in the realm of purpose without necessarily

effecting realization.”

Secondly, It is difficult to ac-

cept the assumption that the majority will Is always right.
If It means majority will by the Qeneral Will.

And thirdly.

It should be added that there is no way of assuring that a

government Is acting according to the Qeneral Will, since
government consists of

a

a

small group of men not differing

from any other man.
In rejecting the view of society as an organic whole

which embodies the General Will, Laskl argued as follows In
part:
IVhen we accept the Idea of the state as an organism,
what Is emphasized Is subjection of its parts to the
welfare of the whole. But In sober fact, the welfare
of the state means nothing if it does not mean the
concrete happiness of its members. In that aspect, the
concept of an organism Is, as Dr. McTaggart brilliantly
Insisted, Inapplicable. For the Individual regards
himself as an end not less than he so regards the state;
and we are here again c onf outideifl by the Important fact
of refusal of absorption Into the whole that Is greater
than ourselves.^

In his book. Studies In the Problems of Sovereignty, Laskl

discussed extensively why he had to reject Hegel's metaphysical concept of state.

In fact, as shown above, Laskl

approach to the nature of the state was

a pragmatic one.

's

He

Insisted that we accept the authority of the state because
we find some goodness In Its Intentions.

^Laskl, Liberty In the Modern State ,

In this light, the

p.

17.

^Laskl, Authority In the Modern State , pp. 34-35.

.

1
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right of the individual could not be derived from the meta-

physical assuraptiona, but rather from the awareness of the
Individual as to what confititutea his happineas.
For the purpose of coordinating different interests of

individuals and associations, there must be a single authority
in any society*

The state, thus, has to have a superior

power over all the other associations to make and execute
This we call legal sovereignty, and it is by definition

laws.

absolute and unlimited in
power within

a

a sense

that there can be no legal

state superior to it, and that there can be

no legal limit to the law-making power of the state*

In this

absolute nature of sovereignty. La ski saw an inherent danger
to individual freedom*

An absolute legal sovereignty was,

to Laski, to constrain the members of society to a certain

unity*

Ihe monistic state, in which the power was concen-

trated into a single center, based on such a concept of

sovereignty was both "administratively and ethically inadequate,"
a

to Laski, because in such a centralized organization,

government would find it difficult to understand the dif-

ferent Interests within the society*

Also in such a society,

individuals would become less responsible in their political
activity, because the problems they encountered would not
be felt to be immediate or personal to each member of the

society*

^Laskl, The Foundation of Sovereignty * p* 240
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tJio

notion of

sovopoligntyj

observing that sovereignty wos secure only when it wss exercised with responsibility, and legal sovereignty was by

definition unlimited and, therefore, irresponsible.

Since

he did not accept the assumption that a government at any

historical moment represented the interests of the society
as a whole, it seemed very dangerous to him to give such

an absolute power to a governn»nt based on the theory of
legal sovereignty*

A stste based on such a legal theory of

sovereignty would disregard the capa.oity of individuals or
groups of people to judge the policies of the state.

On

this subject, Laakl argued as follows:
The monistic theory of the state, making it
sovereign and, therefore, absolute, runs counter to
some of the deepest convictions we can possess. I have
argued that it will ask from us sacrifices it is
against our oonsclenoe to give... .
In the monistic theory of the state there seems no
guarantee that roan will have any being at all* His
personality, for him the most real of all things, would
prove to hove feet of clay.'

All in all, the concept of sovereignty in the Austlnian

sense would produce servility among the people, if it were

applied.

Thus he argued that it was necessary to divide or

decentralise government in order to prevent such servility.
Unified opinion and well-ordered society might mean nothing
else than a predominance of the interests of a single group

which happened to command the authority of the state.

221

In

^Leski, Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty, pp.
k 24 *
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®oclcty It is natural

tliat th.ep6

would be many dlverae

opinions and Interests If these were left to the free ex-

pression of the people*

Instead of making the opinion of

one group of people prevail predominantly, what Laski wanted

was to balance and coordinate many diverse and different

opinions end interests by admitting the right of their own
existence apart from the encroaching power of the powerful
state*
The liberal sentiment of Laski was incompatible with
A

the idealism which claimed that conformity to a code, and

even a compulsory obedience to it, was the very essence of
freedom*

The monistic view of the state seemed to Laski to

imply not only the paralysis of individuality*

To him each

of us is ultimately different from all others, and that is
the ultimate fact of human experience*

Laski

*8

The idealists, in

opinion, failed to see the fact that people who lived

differently also thought differently and that in so varied
a

civilization as ours an absolute standard for human conduct

was out of place*

To Laski, in the Foundation of Sovereignty ,

a

society

is not based on the identical interests of its members,

therefore it is difficult to assume that a government, which

usually represents the interest of an economically superior

group in the society, would act for the Interests of society
as a whole*

This argument is not necessarily substantiated

which
in the workings of modern representative institutions,

16

can. In most cases, reflect various Interests of different

groups in a given society,

but since LasVci believed thst

a government at any historical moment represented only the

interests of a Dingle group--whlch dominated the economic

apparatus of the state

—

he thought it was desirable to

limit the authority of government in order to safeguard the
basic right of the individual.

Lecentralization of governance for the promotion of
Individual happiness was incompatible with the idea of legal
sovereignty in the Austinian sense.

Thus the argument he

proposed for the purpose of promoting individual happiness
•

was his pluralism.

Between 1914 end 1925, it was his inten-

tion to exploit the pluralistic nature of society to counteract the evils of totalitarian philosophy which had begun to

gain momentum in states like Germany and Italy.

In that

sense, Laski's argument for pluralism should be seen as his

crusade against the increasing threat to individual freedom.
Pluralistic bature of Society
The core of pluralism is in the acceptance of the pro-

mise that the parts of the state are as real and as self-

sufficient as the state Itself.

According to Laskl;

do not proceed from the state to the parts of
the state, from the One to Many, on the ground that
the state is more unified than its parts. On the contrary, wo are forced to the admission that the perts are ^
as real, as primary, and as self-sufficient as the whole.
fce

^Laskl, The Foundation of Bovereignty , p. 169

)

17

Ihis Idea was almost diametrically opposed to the
concept
of the monistic tneory of state,

vidual happiness could best

Laskl thought that indi-

promoted by admitting this

be

pluralistic nature of society, and by incorporating this
principle in the system of government,

Although pluralism has been considered to bo Laski's
profound contribution to political theory, he was deeply
indebted to some preceding thinkers
of Me Taggart, Hobert Mac Iver
W, Maitland

,

—

to the Influence

and especially Frederic

who said, ”our fellowship is no fiction, no

symbol, no piece of state machine ly, but a living organism
and real person

This idea was of great importance to

La ski in the formulation of his ideas on pluralism.

To Laskl,

modem society consisted

interest groups.

of many different

And the government in such

a

society

usually represented the interest of economically superior
groups.

Therefore, it was necessary to have

a

less power-

ful oentral government and to have many associations which

were powerful enough to influence the central government,
(However his distrust of a strong central government under-

went a considerable modification when he later adopted

a

near-Marxist view, and when he realized that any measure
for basic social reform could only be fulfilled under a

strong central government.

This point will be discussed

further in Chapter Five which will treat of Laskl
Socialism,

*s
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According to the pluraliEts In generr.l^ assoclatlone
spring spontaneously froa the free play of huraan activity.
They are not sumraoned
one central source.

l^r

fiat

,

nor are they the product of

Since associations are independent of

one another in their origin, they must have equality and

freedom in their activities.

Since men reach out for ends

plural in their nature, the structure of society must he
likewise,

and governrcont must be organized to accomodate

this pluralistic nature of society.

conflicting wills within

a

Since there are many

society, a group of people who

share ainiilar interests form an association in order to

advance their wants mere effectively.

Laski put the nature

of associations as follows:

The group is an attempt to advance some interest
in which its members feel an answer to the wants
of their experience.
They are original functions
of the envirenment* They are an effort so to
adjust that the individual can by its moans feed
impulses which, otherwise, are either starved or
Inadequately nourished, ihe group is real in the
same sense as the state is real. The state does
not call It into being. It Is not, outlsde the categories of lew, dependent upon the state.
It grows
in the whole environment as a natural response to
factors in that environment. It lives end moves
as its surrounding circumstances seem to warrant.'

Laski

*8

argument to prove the spontaneous growth and

the autonomous existence of associations was extensive and

detailed.

For example, in his brilliant essay, "The Poli-

^Leslie Llpson, The Greet Issues of Politics (New
York: 1964), p. 148.
Laski, Oramrner of Foil tics , pp. 256-256.

19

tlcal Theory of the Disruption"

which enalyted the

secession movement of the Church of Scotland in 1843,
Laskl attempted to show that in truth the Churches lived
lives of their own, independent and self-contained, and

that they would not tolerate any harmful external interference*
In the essay Laekl pointed out that, as the pressure
of Interference on the Church of Scotland by the state in-

creased, "the Church* ••is compelled to seek the protection
of its liberties lest it

becomes no more than the religious

depertment of an otherwise secular organization*"®

Thus the

Oenerul Assembly of the Established Church of England, led
by the moderator. Dr* Welsh, in order to protect the freedom
of the Church on ecclesiastical matters, protested to the

state in 1643 by foxming its own government headed by Dr*

Chalmers*

This raised the question of supremacy between the

state and Church*

legal theory of

If one takes the side of the traditional

liie

state, there would not be any question,

since the answer is so obvious*

However, when the Church

claimed exemption from the jurisdiction of the state based
on the concept of societas perfects , the question arose:
"is the state but one of many,

or ere those many but parts

of Itself, the One?"^°

^Laski, Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty , pp. 27-68.
®

lbid *, pp. 27-28.

^^Ibid*. p. 28.

•
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This was the fight of the ohurch against the
notion
of

an all inclusive unitary state.

To the Presbyterians,

"it seemed obvious that the society to which they belonged

was no mere cog-wheel in the machinery of the state, cJestined to work in harmony with its motions.

They felt the strength

of personality which... was complete awl self-sufficient."^^

By 1074, the state admitted the Church was right in its
claim, and the’ supremacy of the parliament on the matter
of ecclesastic al freedom was denied.

Prom this fact, "it

may throw to the winds that omnicompetent State for which
Hegel in Germany and Austin in England have long and firmly

stood the sponsors.

According to Laski, such associati cns -- for example,
the Church cf England as shown above

—

were developing

functional self-government, thereby working out their own

rules and customs.

In his develoimient of pluralism, Laski

aimed at the functional decentralisation of government.

By

this he expected to remedy some defects of the modern repress ntat ive ins titut ion

According to his understanding, the mass of people
was not sufficiently informed on political matters in making
a rational judgment in an election.

The public opinion that

might well sway the outcome of an election was not necess-

^^ Ibid .. p. 66.

^^Ibid.. p. 68.
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arlly the product of reason*

Moreover, the problems that

the legislators woxUd face were extremely complicated and
highly technical in their nature, thereby causing the legislators difficulty in coordinating different Interests in the

society, ard also making it difficult for the general electors
to understand them*

Also, the modern legislative body is so

overburdened with many minute problems that it
in performing its basic functions.

is

hampered

Thus Laskl seems to

suggest that such minute and technical problems could be
solved better by those who were directly related to them,
and that the legislative body should handle only those pro-

blems which were concerned with general principles*
Once the functional decent rail zaticn was introduced,

each association would see
ests and environment*

a

problem based on its own inter-

Since such

a

problem would be of direct

interest to the association, it would have clearer understanding as to what could be the best solution for its own interests*

For example, the miners and mine owners have different

interests to pursue; when they have certain disputes, in order
to reach a common solution that is satisfactory to both parties,

the experience of both parties must have equal validity*
Only then can the solution bo a real one, and generally such
a

solution is bettor than one made by the representative body

which usually reflects the interests

of

certain groups*

Everybody's experience must be shared in the making of government declolons*

That means that everybody has a right to bo

22

consulted In

tiie

making of the decisions

And Laskl

believed that the system of functional decentralisation
was the beat means to achieve this purpose.

On this matter,

Laskl said In pert, ”the consultation of experience therefore means the right to participate In the making of decisions.

For any order that

is

issued without my sharing will bo an

order for those who make it, and not for me...

Therefore

to Laskl a government which recogiilzes the pluralistic nature
of society was best fit to realise Individual freedom.
In the argument so far advanced for pluralism, the pos-

sibility of anarchy may have been Intimated.

It was Laskl *s

belief that one did not have to obey the state, if he felt
a stronger loyalty to the

claim superior to those

of

association and found In It moral
the

state:

Everywhere we find groups within the state which
challenge Its supremacy. They are. It may be. In
relations with the state, a part of It; but one
with It they are not. They refuse the reduction
Men belong to /the state/; but,
to unity... .
also, they belong to the other groups,, end a
competition for allegiance Is continuously possible.

But It should be noted that Laskl, by setting up limits to
the power and function of associations, attempted to prevent

such a result as political and

The power

social anarchy.

of association is limited ty the fact that It does not have

^'^Laskl, Qrammar of Politics
^

,

p.

248.

^Ibld ., p. 246.

^^Laskl, The Foundations of Sovereignty ,

p.

169.
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the power to inflict corporal punishment upon its
members.

It is also limited ly the refusal or willingness of
indivi-

dual members to accept its decisions.
a

In his attempt to set

limit to the functions of associations, LasWl said In part,
the vocational bodies. . .have value for the resolution of

functloial problems; but they are not... built to deal with
the

general Issues shlch must be faced by society as

a

whole.

Thus Laski was not denying the necessity for the existence of harmony in society.

What he was emphasizing was

that the state ought not to claim unity to the degree that
it sacrifices the individual human personality.

The unity,

that is to say, if its existence is to be tolerated, must

be such a broad and all-inclusive one that no individuality
of the members cf society is

.to

be

sacrifled.

Laski claimed that each association had its own sover-

eignty within itself, and it should be limited like that of
the state.

For example, vocational organizaticns have the

right to solve problems of their own, provided that the
nature of the problems are primarily their own concern.

If

the problems were general ones in their nature transcending

the

scope of their own interests, they should be dealt with

by a higher organization, namely

a

government.

It is diff-

icult at this point as how to determine the nature of

certain issue:

whether it should be dealt,

^®I>a8kl, Grammar of Politics

,

p. 73.

with by

a

a state
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or by a particular asaociatlon, because no association
can

act in Independence; the groupe and associations impinge

upon each other as they pursue their alms, and create
need for order and harmony*

a

And for the creation and

maintenance of order and harmony, there must exist an
Bssoclaticn to which the remaining associations must be
subordinated*
However, Laski seems to have believed that the starting point should be in the hands of individuals or assoc-

iations who have the sense of right and wrong, because they

usually have more relevant relations with
issue*

any

particular

Only after all the pragmatic experiments by the in-

dividuals and groups fail, should the state, which

is

more

inclusive and has a higher moral claim, tackle the problem*
In such cases, each individual should pay careful scrutiny

in crder to prevent any mis judgment by the government, be-

cause a gDvernment is after all made of a small group of
people who are not,

people*

in essence,

different from any other

The government, which contains the federal nature

of society, provides bettor channels for the operation of

an active consent of the people than any other method.

encouragement of decentralization on

a

The

geographical and

functicnal base would help to create the sense of respon-

sibility among men, as well
ia

a a the

self-government which

essential to the democratic system*
Laski

*8

advocacy of guild socialism was abandoned.

25

however, after 1926 on the ground that It had practical

difficulty In providing the minimum requirement for the
practical unity of government.

And another difficulty

with guild aoolallam wee that "there la no assurance that
union of all guilds into a single body will be superior to
the body of territorial representatives."^*^
he came to the conclusion that the

By and large,

state was a necessary

organ for the purpose of social, political, and economic

reforms.

However, he proposed

to

check the power of the

state st every level of administrative organization in
order to Insure the freedom of Individuals and groups.

18

As Laaki realized more the need of central govern-

ment with enough power to cqpe with the general issues
of the society, especially after the Great Depression of

1929, he began to move away from pluralism and came closer

to the acceptance of the ministio stand.

It was historical

oiroums ttknce that forced not only Laski but also the other
plural Ists such as 0. D. H. Cole to retreat from pluralism.

^*^

Ibld *

,

p. 84.

^®Mertln, op. cit .

,

p.

68.
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The Aim of the State
^*®*^^*® concept of the

etiite

seome to be & oilxture

moral approboh in Ito ulm and a pragmatic

5

one in its practice*

he put the theory of the state

in one of his early works; a Uieory of the state must be

examined not so much in the context of claims of authority
but by their actual validation in terms of pi*actlce.

assumption that

trie

his

state existed to promote individual

happiness was an a prl ori assumption,

ae

he admitted him-

self, but he si^gested that the importance of the assump-

tion was as an index to the achievement of government,

rather than

as

a

definite nature of the state*

when he said that it was helpful

above all,

to be told that the object

of the state was to secure the good life, the term used as
the object of the

state was fundamentally different one from

the absolute term used in the school of idealists,

19

which

put the state on higher plane than its members*
Ahile Laski was still a strong exponent of pluralism,

the aim of the state was fixed to prunote the good life of

individual*

Even in his later writings, the basic aim of

the state remained the same, although the method to accom-

plish this aim has undergone considerable modification.
him,

tliC

To

only power the goverximent was entitled to exeiclse

^^Laski, authority in tne Modern State

,

p. 31*
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was the power delegated by the people to fulfill the
aim
of the state, that Is to

say, to promote the good life*

The state should get the loyalty of people only ty achlevIng this pur{)08 e« £0 In order to solve the dilemma which

derives from the concept of state in the idealist school
of

thought, to which Xia8kl*8 aim of the state was very

similar, and the practical example of the contrary experience under the corxupted government, Laskl made a distinc-

tion between the state end the government*
a

Laskl accorded

higher moral claim to the state, because It had more

Inclusive power than any other association, and also because he wanted to provide some Index by which to measure
the achievement of a governmental action*

To Laskl the

government was composed of a snail group of fallible men;

It was liable to make mistakes, end the Individuals In
society should scrutinize the actions of government by the

Index so provided*

By employing such logic, Laskl was able

to deny the monlsts* Insistence on an absolute claim to the

authority of the state*
In some aspects, Laskl

's

theory of the state was In

accordance with the argument of

a

pragmatist who said:

Some make such a sharp distinction between the
state and a government that, from the standpoint
of theories, a government may be corrupt and the
State by the same Idea retain Its Inherent dignity
Officials may be mean, obstinate.
and nobility*

^Q lbld *

.

p*
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proud and stupid and yet the nature of the state
which they serve remain essentially unimpaired.
Since, however, a public Is organized Into a
state through Its government, the state la as Its
officials are. Only through constant watchfulness
and criticism of ptfcllc officials by citizens can
a state be maintained in Integrity and usefulness.

Thus Laskl shared the belief with Mr. Dewey that It la

necessary to criticize public officials In order to prevent the state from being corrupted by Its officials.

There

seems to have been strong Influence of John Dewey *s pragma-

tism on
19 26

Laslcl

during the letter

stay in America.

»s

Until

when he wrote A Qrammar of Politics , the state was to

Laskl not different fundamentally from any other association
(as discussed above).

Although he conceded a hl^er moral

claim to the state. It was not

every member

of

a

supreme organ to which

society owed unconditional allegiance.

On

the contrary. If one felt stronger loyalty to a group to

which he belonged such as church or trade union, he was
Justified In making

a

decision against the will of the state

As of 1921, when he wrote Authority In the Modern State

Laskl rejected strongly the common will of Dr. Bosanquet,
who Insisted that the common will resided In society apart

from the will of Individual members

The Insis-

of society.

tence upon the existence of such commcn will was

to

Laskl

nothlr^ more than "a subtle interpretation of Rousseau *s

^^John Dewey, The Public
Henry Holt and Compel5y,

Its Problems
pp* 68-66.

tind

(New York:
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formula*"^^

In hie crltloiem of such argument, Laekl said:

He (Lr. Boeanquet) believes that ultimate power
must reside in the community as a whole; but he
insists that the conception Is meaningless unless
the power finds sane determinate expression.
He
places sovereignty, therefore, in the state and
he defines the state as 'the entire hierarchy of
institutions by which life is determined.' Sovereignty, in his view, really belongs to the general
will, to the acts, that is to say, of the state's
best self. But this, surely, does no more than
move the inquiry back to a further stage. The state
must find organs for the expressions of its selfhood;
and Dr. Bosanquet gives us no orlterlan by which to
recognize the expression. The sovereignty of the
general will. Indeed, is very likely the assertion
that rlgjit and truth must prevail; but it does
not tell us how certainly to discover the presence
of right and truth.

Laski's concept of the state underwent a rather drastic

revision after 1925,

Some of

tiie

reasons behind his change

in the role of the state were the economic depression in

early 1920s in England which made him realize the necessity
for a stronger central planning and control in economic

activities, the increasing strength of the Labor Party, and
the formation of the MacDonald government in 1931 in the

period of Great Depression,

Although, Laski's view on the

role of the State became an almost orthodox one, he still

rejected the notion of General Will, the philosophical

concept of the idealist school on the state.

^^Laskl, Authority in the Modern State ,
^^Ibid,

,

pp, 27-28.

p.

27,

30

He stllX omin^&lned

IHg wiXl of t^e stete

Wfts

the will which woe adopted out of the conflict of myriad

will® whloh contend with each other for the maetery of

social forces*

Thus he rejected the existence of a single

will of the state which transcends IwSlvldual wills.

Hut

after 1926, he admitted the role of the state as a final
source of reference of various contending wills of different interest groups.

Since the state was an arbitrator

of many conflicting wills, the actions of government should

be carefully scrutinised by the people who were to be In-

fluenced by Its actions.

And because the state was repre-

sented by a small group of people who might pervert the

furpose of the state for selfish Interest, the necessity
for scrutinising the actions of government was of great

necessity.

This was

a

point of proof that he still regard-

ed the Individual as finite.

Especially when he aald

,

"the

will of the state Is only my will in so far as I freely lend
my judgment to Its en foroement* . .An adequate theory of social

organisation must always begin by recognizing that the Individual Is finite.

If he Is a member of a herd, he Is also

outside of It and passing judgment upon Its actions,

«26

Laskl was still far from believing In monistic view of state.

^^Laskl, A Grammar of Politics ,

^^Ibld.. p. 29.

p. 38.

»
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The extent and the nature of power given to the
state

after 1925 was that the state must possess the powers
nec-

essary for the accomplishment of the aim of the state.

In

A Qrammar of Politics . Laskl argued that the modern state
was the final legal depository of the social will.
the perspective of all other organizations.

It set

It brought

within Its power all forms of human activity the control
of which It deemed desirable.

It was, moreover, the Im-

plied logic of this supremacy of the state that whatever

remained free of Its control did so by Its permission.,.
Furthermore, the Importance of the state was well expressed

when he stressed that the state was the key-stone of the
social arch, and It moulded the form and substance of the

myriad human lives with whose destinies It was charged.
This view of the state was an evidence of the revision of

mind that he had undergone since the time when Laskl was
an earnest pluralist who saw little distinction between the

state and other forms of associations except the manner of

respective membership.

Although the state was still an

association that existed to promote the happiness of people,
the

aim of the state seemed to focus upon the enrichment

of common life In egalitarian society.

Furthermore, Laskl

gave a new meaning to state when he said that the state

"differs from (other forma of association) in that mcmber-

26 xbid •

p.

21,

32

ship iB compulBory upon all that live within Ita territorial axQbit, and that it can, in the last resort, enforce its

obligations upon its subjects."^’^

The new role of the state

as discussed in A Qrammar of Politics was Leskl*s admission

of the importance of the state as an organization which

should concern itself with the control over other associa-

tions, particularly economic groups, so that every member
of the society would be assured the minimum well-being

which was necessary to lead a civilized life.

27 Ibid

. .

p.

37
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OH^iPTI'JR

III

THE NaIURE op AUTHORITY

&Sl Source

of Authority

Laakl opened, the first chapter of Authority In the

Modern State

,

quoting fro® Aristotle, saying, "man Is a

community building animal."

Ihe acceptance of tills pro-

position meant that he admitted the necessity of authority
In a given community for the maintenance of its own life.

Since the authority

of

the state has

a

Individual freedom, Laskl devoted much

direct bearing on
of

his attention

In the analysis of authority In the modern state.

For him

the Hobbeslan theory of authority which claimed the basis
of authority to be force and fear was not satisfactory to

explain why the mass of people should obey the command of
one or few men.

On the other hand, Laskl rejected Rousseau's

formula of General Will.

In his opinion, when one was forc-

ed to conform to the common will by outside force, he was

no longer free.^

Moreover, there was no way to know General

Will, If It existed.

For Laskl, the basis upon which the power within a
state resta was the individual conscience; the judgment based on Individual conscience affords rights which are beyond

^Laskl, h Grammar of Politics

,

p.

33
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control and cannot be denied by the state.

Therefore, In

final analysis, the ultimate depository and source of

authority resides in the individual.

Thus Laskl says:

Men accept /authority/ either because their own
will finds parts expression there or because,
assuming the goodness of its intention which lies
behind it, they are content, usually, not to resist its imposition. But then law is not a command.
It is merely a rule of convenience. . .Where sovereignty
prevails, where the state acts, it acts by the consent
of men.^
The consent of people, that is to say, the source of authority,
is liable to suspension at any time people think that the

government is not acting for the fulfillment of the purpose
of the state.

be absolute.
a

duty

to

Therefore, the authority of the state cannot

Moreover, the individual member of society has

scrutinize the actions of government, since he is

himself the source of the authority.

Without scrutinizing

the actions of government, he would have no right or knowledge

necessary to protest or to disobey, if it be necessary, the
state.

Laski believed that there was no & priori certainty
that a government would be obeyed.

Instead, the posslblli-

ty of anarchy was theoretically at every moment present.
He not only considered that the possibility of anarchy

existed at every moment, but also believed the possibility

^Laskl, Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty , pp.
12-13.

^Laski, author it V in the Modern State , p. 30.
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to be a check on government, and thue an aid In
maintaining
a

democratic eyetcm.

He refuted the legal theory of sov-

ereignty, saying that no man actually surrenders his whole

being to the state

To borrow his words once again:

Whatever the requirements of legal theory, in
actual fact, no man surrenders his whole being
to the state* He has a sense of right and
wrong* If the state, or its instruments, goes
too consistently against that sense, he is
pricked into antagonism* The state, that is to
say, is for him sovereignty only where his conscience is not stirred against its performance*
Nor is this all* He expects it to make possible
for him the attainment of certain good*®
llierefore, if the state is going to claim the obedience of

people, it must maintain always a higher moral claim than
that of the individuals or other forms of associations*

It

also has to provide the people with the necessary information concerning the aim and program of the state so that

member of society can have fair opportunities to scrutinise
the actions of the government*

Only by achieving the pur-

pose of the state, or by showing to the people that it is

sincerely attempting to achieve it, can the state legitimately claim the obedience of the people*
What disturbed Laski, in actual fact, was the actions
of government in practice:

it was very seldon shown that

^See the Political Theory of Disruption, pp. 27-60*
In the Problems of Sovereignty *
Studies
in
®Laskl, authority in the Modem State

,

pp* 42-43*

36

a

government acted impartially in order to realire indivi-

dual happiness as

a

whole.

On this matter he expressed a

deep lamentation, saying that, "it is today

a coimaon

place

that the real source of authority in any state is with the

holders of of economic power.

The will that is effective is

their will; the commands that are obeyed are their comnands."®
This could well have been the reason, when he was still a

pluralist, why Laski tried so hard to limit the power of

central government, an3

to

disperse it

as m\j»h

as

possible

to prevent the misuse of the power by a smell group of people.

The federalized form of government, in which the power was

widely dispersed, seemed to Laski the best form of government
to protect the basic rights of the

people.

The natural rights

of the people did not emerge with the birth of the

nation state, but they

Even during the medieval

preceded it.

states, there was the conception

modem

cf

natural rights, that is

to say, the prince had a duty to protect his subjects as well
as to rule.*^

Thus the claim of legal sovereignty, which de-

manded an absolute authority under the name of unity and

a

priori concept of the organic nature of the state, seemed

rather incredible to Laski.
In his oplnlcn, the authority of the state ought

®Leskl, The Foundation of Sovereignty , p. 62.
*^

Ibid .

,

pp. 9-10.
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to be a coordinating one among the different
Intercit

groups within a society, rather than a hierarchical
one In
which a single will Imposes from above, "Authority Imposed

from wlttiout can never achieve that effect over a period.
Its val\ies are personal to those who make the decisions.
It falls eventually to coordinate the experience affected

by Its decisions.

That Is why, moreover, there Is a point

at which the administration of decisions must bo decentralized If It la to be creative."®

Authority and Liberty
Laskl's Insistence upon near absoliite freedom has been

already discussed in his argument for the pluralism.

It

should be also recalled that he once seemed to have preferred democracy surrounded ty the possibility of anarchy over

authoritarianism in order not to sacrifice the basic Indi-

vidual freedom.

However, since authority Is Ipso facto a

necessity for the malntenoxx^e of

oi'der,

without which liberty

is Inconceivable, he had to compromise authority and liberty;

or rather, he had to set a limit beyond idilch authority and

liberty could not trespass.

In his early writings, Laski

minimized the lmi)ortance of authority because
Its encroachment on personal freedom.

of

the fear of

This could have been

®Laskl, A Grammar of Politics , p. 243
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hl8 natural reaction against the rising totalitarian

philosophy across the Channel.
In 1919 Laski wrote:

A State, after all, is no mysterious entity.
It is only a territorial society into which, from
a variety of historical reasons, a distinction between rulers and subjects has been introduced.
Ihe only justification for a claim by a government
of its obedience is the clear proof that it satisfies the material and moral claims of tnose over
whom it exercises control...
Oovcrniaent is only a convention which men, on the
whole, accept because of a general conviction that
its effort is for good. Where the machine breaks
down, where the purpose of those «ho drive it becomes to an important class sinister, it is humanly
inevitable that an effort towards change should be
made.^
\IVhat

he implies here

is

that we must be always ready to

withdraw our allegiance, if we feel
not fulfillir^

tiie

tiriat

the government is

purpose of the state.

Ihe state is en-

titled to the loyalties of the people only
its aim or by dem

cxis t rating

is

achieving

that it is doing its best to

realize individual happiness.
governnent

by

And to judge whether the

acting according to the purpose of the state

is solely depended upon the individual conscience.

By

giving such rights to each individual, a state can be regarded to exist for the individual »s freedom and happiness
As strong authority was a great threat to freedom,
to Laski force imposed from without was antithetic to free

^Laskl, Authority in the Modern State ,

p.

374.
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dom, since it was not desired by the individual.
tlie

Therefore,

best way to safeguard freedom was to limit the authority

of governiaent*

”lf in any state there is a body of men who

possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule
can never be free.”^®

Because, in his belief, "uncontrolled

power is invariably poisonous to those who possess It,"^^
It was the general tendency that the group of people wno

possessed the political power tended to think that what was
good for them was also good for the community as a whole,

Moreover, if this group or person happened to I'epresent the

higher economic interest, as was usually the case,

it was

difficult to expect them to sot impartially,
When Laski witnessed a group of people who could not
enjoy freedom due mainly to economic poverty, he realized

that mere abaenoe of restraint was not sufficient for the

self-realization

of

an individual.

He felt some need for

governmental actions in order to bring them out to the

center of social attention again,

When he realized the

need for a aoc ial responsibility for the underprivileged

people, Laski undertook a considerable revision as to the
role of government; that is to say, he was compelled to

admit the necessity for a government with some commanding

power to carry out social and economic reforms.

^^Leakl, Liberty in the Modern State , p,
^^ Ibid ,

,

p, 2,

2.

However,
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at the same time, he was careful to set a clear line be-

yond which authority should not trespass*
As to individual rights, Laskl*s argument became

somewhat more moderate than when he was an ardent pluralist*

In A Grammar of Politics

*

Luskl said in part that,

"there are rules* * *whlch I ought obey even If I disapprove;
for, obviously. If each man is to follow his every impulse

wherever it leads, an organized social life would be impossible*

It means that force must be used in those

directions only where the common sense of society is on
the side of the type of conduct it seeks to compell*"^^

Thus some limitations upon freedom seemed essential to

promote the happiness of men and to maintain

a

necessary

order, especially when he said:
1 might not resist if 1 am convinced that the
state is seeking, as best it may, to play its
part; and for most that perception will doubtless result from what Inquiry they undertake*
I ought not, further, to resist unless I have
reasonable ground for the belief that the
changes I advocate are likely to result in
the end I have in view; I must, moreover, be
certain that the methods 1 propose to realize
my end will not, in their realization, change
its essential character: men have often enough
sought power for good and ended ty exercising
it for its own soke*^^

By 1926 Laskl come to the conclusion that there must
be a balance between the liberty we need end the authority

^^Laskl, A Grammar of Politics * P* 36*

^^Laski, Ibid ** p. 39*
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that Is essential to maintain an order for the
protection
of those who were economically underprivileged.

Laskl was

increasingly disturbed over the knowledge that, when
everybody was left alone under the free economic system.
It
was

almost certain that the society would be divided Into two
classes, otiose respective Interests could not be reconciled
In the long run.

The consequence of such a circumstance

was usually the loss of liberty by those who did not have

sufficient economic means.

For example, it was difficult

for those who were uneducated due to the lack of financial

means to participate In state affairs freely or to enjoy
full citizenship.

The Problem of Obedience
In consideration of the nature of the state that Laskl

discussed earlier.

It

becomes rather obvious that the state

has no absolute title to the obedience of the people.
a

Thus

question arises as to how one should explain or make

legitimate the obedience.

Since there exist various conf-

licting wills in a given society, the will of the state

ought to be that one of those wills which proves Itself to
be p?e -eminent and superior in Its utility over the other

wills.

The argument that we have to obey the law, since

It Is the ocmmand of the state, does not answer the fund-

amental question, because It returns to the old question
of whether a command of the state is a legitimate one or

42

not*

Moreover^ to Laskl, law was a rule of convention rather

than the ooromand of the atate^ because^ the origin of law was
not In the s priori assumption of the state, but In the con-

sent of the Individual members of the state.

regarded man as

a

free and responsible moral agent who was

capable of rendering
he

Hence, he

a

sound judgnent In most cases.

Thus

argued that "man should do that which he deems morally

right, and that the only obedience he can render Is the

obedience consonant with his ethical standard,"

14

Whether or not the conduct of the government was In
agreement with the elm of the state was for an Individual
to Judge, but not for the agent of the state.

If a man

believed that any given act of the government was against
his own will, he not only had a right to refuse obedience

to It, but also had a moral obligation to register his

active dissent from the decisions of authority.

Here arises

the question of the validity of Individual Judgment,

Of

course, Laskl did not accept the proposition that every

Individual could make

a

rational Judgment In all occasions.

On the contrary, he assumed that human being was not com-

pletely rational animal,
a state in

but Laskl seems to have preferred

which a danger may arise from the dissent of an

individual, to the danger of Leviathan state In which

a

handful of men have control over tne entire population.

^^Laskl, Authority In the Modem State , p, 206
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La8kl*s extreme Individualistic view

of

the problem

of obedience was shown well when he stated that,
"the

only ground upon which the tndlvldual csn give or be

asked his support for the state is from the conviction
that what it ia aiming at is, in each particular case,

Then he went on to say that, "wo deny*. .that the

good***

general end of the ideal state colours the policy of

given act of a special state.

a

And that denial involves

from each member of the state continuous scrutiny of its
purpose and its method.
It is of some interest to note Laski's change in his

view on the problem of obedience.

By 1926, when he wrote

A Orammor of folitios . he seems to have begun to realize
the importance of maintaining a greater degree of social
ozxSer

in order to achieve the aim of the state.

It should

be remembered that the year 1924 was the time when the

Labor Party came into power for the first time in its his-

Prom

tory.

a practical viewpoint, if any social reforms

were to be opposed, as may have well been expected, by the

minority opposition party, it would lead to great difficulty
in realizing the aim at the state as envisaged by the Labor

Party, even if it were supported by the majority of the

people.

But there is no reason why Laski’s argument for

disobedience should not be applied to an opposition party

^^Ibid.

,

p* 46.
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that does not agree with the Labor programs,

in order to

meet this difficulty, he revised his earlier view on
the
problem of obedience after 1925,

It is not surprising, how*

ever, to see the modification he made on the problem, since
he wasa theorist who always tried to theorize in terms of

practical politics*

For this reason he has been accused

of being inconsistent in his argument, but it should not

be assumed that he completely abandoned the individualistic

view on the matter of individual rights.

It was rather his

attempt to compromise the individual claim with that of
authority.

For instance, Laski still argued In A Grammar

of Politics as follows*.

Our obligation to obey the state is, law apart,
an obligation dependent upon the degree to which
the state achieves Its purpose*
We are the
judges of that achievement* • *We must obey the
state, not because its theoretic purpose is a
splendid one, but because of our conviction
that it is genuinely asking to make that pur*
pose valid in events*^®
But in the same book, he seems to emphasize the human

being as a community building animal,

by emphasizing this

aspect of hum«n nature, Laski tried to make legitimate

certain degree of authority*

a

Thus in a modern state, in

his view, "spontanlety ceases to be practical,

and

the

enforced acceptance of a common way of action becomes the

necessary condition of

a

corporate civilization*”^'^

^^Laskl, A Grammar of Politics
17

Ibid *, p* 18

,

pp. 26-27.

i*urther,
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he went on to say that the

rlgjtit

of die obedience la "rea-

sonably to be exercised only at the margins of political
conduct*

Mo community could hope to fulfill its purpose

if rebellion becotosa a settled habit of the population*"^®
This argument was a considerable revision of his

earlier view «^loh said that the state was surrounded by
the possibility of anarchy*

/.'hen

Laakl adopted the view

of near-aarxlan socialism, after experiencing the depres-

sion of 1929 and the defection of the Maolonald government,
his theory of disobedience seems to have returned to the

earlier view which stressed the right

of

cisobedlence,

but the disobedience of the Individual seems to have been

replaced by that of a class*

The further discussion of

this point will bo postponed to chapter five, which will

deal with the political Ideas of Laskl as a socialist*

^Qlbld*

,

p* 61
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CHAPTER IV
LIBERTY AND E^tUAUTY

La»ki*8 Concept of Liberty

A discus Bl on of liberty occupied one of the most Important pieces in the writings of Professor Lsskl; his

discussion of its meaning as well as the social and eeonmlc conditions in which liberty could be best realized

was rather extensive and thorough in his writings.
many argisnents he developed in his early writings

,

Like
the

core of La8kl*B arguments on liberty were primarily directed against Hegelian idealism.

Thus Laski asked whether

freedom meant, as Hegel meant, to live the life that

authority ordains, or whether it meant the reco^iition
that there were certain reserves within the individual
mind about which ultimate resistance must be organized.
In order to understand Laski 's position on liberty, it

would be useful to see some aspects of the Hegelian con-

ception of it.

Freedom in the Hegelian sense is more

or less a

conformity with the law and custom as Interpreted

ty

the

ethical spirit of the particular society to which the
individuals belong.^

A critical analysis of the Hegelian

btate,
^L. T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory o f the
ISIS)
Ltd.
P*
»
,
(London: George Allen 4: Unwin
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concept would provide ue with the starting point for
understanding Laslcl's conception of freedom.
a

Dr. Bosanquet,

faithful disciple of Hegel, described Liberty as follows

In the first decade of the twentieth century:

Liberty, no doubt. Is as Rousseaihas told
us, so far agreeing with Mill, the essential quality
of human life.
It Is so, we understood, because It
Is the condition of our being ourselves.
But now
that It has occurred to us that in order to be
ourselves we must be always becoming something
which we are not. In other words, we must always
recognize that we are something more than we have
become, liberty, as the condition of our being
ourselves, cannot simply be something which we have,
still less something we have always had -- a status
quo to be maintained.
It must be a condition relevant to our continued struggle to assert the control
of something In Us, which we recognize as Imperative
upon us or as our real self, tut which we obey in a
very imperfect degree. Thus It is that we can speak^
without a contradiction, of being forced to be tree*
In Hegelian sense, free will is the will which determines

Itself; It forms

a

raticnal iihole or system of conduct in

idilch individual will has to play certain predetermined roles

for the rational whole.

This means that every member of

society must act according to the prescribed law and custom
of society in order to be free.

It is not for each Individual

to judge whether the law or customs are against the individual

conscience.

This was another aspect of the conservative

nature of Hegelian philosophy.

It la

true that a society

will end up in total anarchy, if liberty is understood as

mere absence of restraint and if people act accordingly, but

^Ibid

. ,

pp. 126-27
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't}i

6

1*6

Is no jus^lfl ostlon for Hogelians to sssuins that tho

liberty is equivalent to the oommand of state.
In rejecting Hegel's thesis that freedom was conformity
to law and custon, Laski refused to accept the feasibility
of discovering in the social worlds laws analogous in ohar-

aoter to those of inanimate nature.
The attempt /to discover such laws in the
social world as those that are found in the physical world/ is impossible.
It neglects the fact
that the social world is not only permanently dynamic but also pexmanently novel; the factors in
its equations are the active wills of individual
men who, by scrutinizing the contingent results,
are in a position to change them. They make change
by willing charge. Laws, therefore, which have the
tough consistency of natural laws, those, for example,
of physios and chemistry, are impossible of attainment in the political realm. A social life according
to nature, as art is man's nature; and a life according to the higieat principle of art depends upon a
view of beauty or goodness which can claim universal
application.^
Thus Laski was much in line with traditional liberalism with
a

deep commitment to social engineering for the betterment

of individual happiness and the Increase of individual free-

dom.

Individual freedom based upon one's own conscience was
the center of his argument.

He maintained, until he realized

that individual freedom had little meaning without the social
permanent
and economic means to realize it, that “the only

^Laskl, an Introduction to Politics (London, George
p* fes*
,
Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
“*Ibid.
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safeguard of democratlo government is that the unchanging
and ultimate sanction of Intellectual decision should be

the (Individual) conscience.**^

It was the realm within

which even the state cannot, as well as should not, have
right to interfere.

On this matter he argued as follows:

We thus Insist. .. that the mind of each man...
pass judgment upon the state; and we ask for his
condemnation of its policy where he feels It In
conflict with the right. That, surely. Is the onlyenvlronment In which the plant of liberty can flourish.
It implies. . .insistence that the allegiance
of man to the state is secondary to his allegiance
to what he may conceive his duty to society as a
who le ....
In ordinary acceptance of the term, such an attitude
denies the validity of any sovereign power save that
of the right: and it urges that the discovery of
right is, on all fundamental questions, a search,
upon which the separate members of the state must
individually engage.^

This argument was an integral part of Laski's pluralism.

He

believed that individual freedom could be maximized in a

society where the power of the state was highly decentralized.

Liberty as an individual initiative and continuous
creative activities for the mess of people was difficult to
realize in the monistic state except for those few who were

economically privileged.

His belief that the real freedom

could not be realized in the monistic state as well as under

^Laski, Authority in the Modern State , p. 55.

^Ibid.

,

pp. 121-22.
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the lalse*-falre syatem led him to accept the
positive free-

dom of Thomas H. Oreen#

Although Oreen was known as the

British neo-Hegelian^ It should not be neglected that he was
also Influential, as the founder of the Oxford liberal move-

ment, in the movement of Pablan Socialism In England,

it

was from Oreen, Laskl adopted his definition of positive
freedom.

He supplemented It by, at the same time, accept-

ing Lord Acton’s axiom in order to safeguard the right of
the Individual claim based upon one’s own conscience,'^

by

positive freedom in Green’s sense. It Is meant that the
state should see that each member of society is provided

with adequate conditions In developing oneself to the fullest degree,
(iuotlng from Green and Acton, Laskl said:

’When we speak of freedom as something to be
highly prised’, said T. H. Green, *we mean a positive power of doing or enjoying /something worth
doing or enjoying/ end that, too, something that
we do or enjoy in common with others.' That Is
more valuable than the negative conception because
It Insists on what. In this age, we feel to be
fundamental In liberty -- the power of adding
sanethlng to the quality of the common life. But
though Green had elseit does not, of coux se
tell us what It
whei^ answered that question
Is worthwhile to do or enjoy; and here again,
acute difference of opinion Is possible. It was
as a historian that Acton approached the problem,
and hla answer had a connotation not to be nls’By liberty’, i:i® said, ’I mean the
understood.
assuraivse that every man will be protected In

—

—

^Friedrich A. flayek thought Lord Acton had represented
century alo^ with
the true Individualism In the nineteenth
am and Economix
Alexis de Tooquevllle; see Hayek, Individual 1948
Press,
;, p. 4.
Order. (Chicago: University of Chicago
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doing what he believes hla duty against the influence of authority, custom, and opinion.
Laskl*s acceptance of Green's definition of freedom,

which tolerates

a

greater degree

of

governmental authority

for the promotion of common good, seems to be in contra-

diction with his argument for the Individual right which
can even defy the authority of state, if one's conscience
tells him to resist.

But, by introducing Acton's defini-

tion of freedom, Laski attenpted to preserve his original

position of safeguarding the right of individual.

By em-

ploying both terms, Laski was able to resort to the definition of Acton when he wished to defend the individual rights;
and to that of Green when he was fighting for the interest
of the social and ec anomic under-dog.

The focus of his discussion of liberty rests upon the

fact that, in the capitalistic society, the opportunities
for a creative self-expression were enjoyed only by those
vdio

possess economic power.

His egalitarian philosophy

did not allow him to be contented with such social injus-

tice.

Warning not to confuse the absence of restraint in

the economic sphere with freedom, Laski said, "there may

be absence of restraint in the economic sphere, for example,

in the sense that
he may choose.

a

man may be free to enter any vocation

Yet if he is deprived of security in em-

®Laskl, Authority in the Modern btate , p. 56.
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ployment he becomes the prey of mental end physical servi-

tude Incompatible with the very essence of liberty.**®

That,

could have been the reason why, In spite of his great em-

phasis on the value of the Individual he accepted Green's

definition of positive freedom, which acknowledged the role
of government to set a minimum standard below which no member of the society should fall.

Such a remark as

'to

compel

obedience to rules of convenience which promote rl^t living
Is not to make a man unfree' has been regarded by some as

fundamentally not different from Hegelian conception of
freedom which Insisted that Individual had to be forced to
be free.

But, under a closer scrutiny. It should be noted

that the rule of convenience Laskl had In mind was rather a

broad norm of social conduct derived from the experience of
the Individual members of society.

It was, moreover, quite

distinct from Hegel's ethical spirit idilch transcends Individual experience and, therefore, beyond the reach of
scrutiny by the knowledge and conscience of the Individual.

Although Laskl did not define the Individual right
clearly, he ssld ti»t the Individual right was something
the pragmatist would understand.

By stating that the

Individual right was something the Individual ought to

concede because experience had proved It to be good,^^

®Laskl, Liberty In the Modern State , p. 4.
^^Laskl, Studies In the Problems of Sovereignty, p. 18.
V.

%
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Laskl gave relative value to the

rl^t

as the aouroe of

individual freedom.

Economic Equality and Liberty
As discussed above » the primary reason for Laski^s

acceptance of positive freedom seems to be his belief that
without a certain economic basis liberty becomes almost

meaningless for those who have to exhaust themselves in
acquiring their dally bread*

Thus equality, especially in

the economic sense, becomes an important condition for

realizing freedom; to Laski, freedom and equality are not
antithetic but complement aiy to each other*

To Laski,

therefore, the mitigation of inequality was a path to
freedom*
In Laski

*8

opinion, capitalistic democracy lacked

the necessary conditions of realizing freedom, due to its

inherent nature of inequality*

Laski argued that men can-

not achieve freedom when a few citizens enjoy special privilege, or when the right of some depends upon the pleasure
of others, or when ths incidence of the power of the state

was biased in favor of one group*

For him the absence

individual
of special privilege, adequate opportunities for

initiative, and the minimum guarantee of economic well
being sufficient to enjoy

a

civilized life were the essen-

^^Leane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski ,
pp* 106-9*
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tlal conditions of liberty.

Such

a

belief led him closer

tavaz^ the orthodox Marxism after 1930, and more about

him as socialist will be discussed in the following chapter.

In his argument for the complementary nature of liberty

and equality, Laski argued as follows:
It (liberty) means the guarantee of avenues
through s4iich that Initiative may find its way to
its appointed end.
Obviously, therefore, liberty
is Inseparable from equality, since the a priori
distinction which announces differences of access
restricts the chance of liberty to a few fortunately situated persons in the state. A society in
which men are given an equal opportunity of selfrealizati^ is, also* a society in which there is
justice.^*

Certainly, then, equality as an equal opportunity for self-

realization does not contradict the idea of freedom.

Laski

denied an equality meaning an identity of treatment, but he
meant that each individual had

a

equal right to claim his

happiness.
It was after 1920, when he returned from America, that
t

Laski began to pay grave attention to the importance of

econondos.

It was the time when the post-World War I boom

gave way to a depression, and the number of unemployed was
lncz*easing with alaz*iriing rapidity.

Such a situation, in

which the mass of people devoted their energy to acquiring
daily bread, convinced Laski that economic insecurity was
antithetic to the realization of freedom.

^^Laski, A Grammar of Politics ,

p.

It also convinced

273.

a
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him that certain political action was necessary to solve

such economic problems.

Thus he came to regard It as

positive duty of the state to secure for its members

a
a

certain minimum standard of economic life, possibly through
the means of a planned economy.

Although a certain degree of economic equality was

necessary for freedom, as discussed above, equality and
freedcm were not the same thing to Laski.

People can be

equal under a despotic rule without enjoying any freedom;
equality does not necessarily produce freedom.
requires a certain degree of economic equality.

But freedom
Thus he

argued that, "we are in the difficulty that every step we
take towards freedom is

a

step towards the equalization of

privileges now held uncquelly."

and he went on to say

that, "the penumbra of freedom. Its purpose and its life,
is the movement for equal! ty*"^^

Laski believed that

eoonomio equality provided the necessary conditions for
people to be free.

Liberty Involves equality; the two are not
antithetic; liberty only begins to operate significantly upon the plane of equality; without the
it Is but a name of noble sound end squalid result, for equality supplies the basis out of which
liberty comes to have a positive meaning, all
are therefore equally entitled to those rights
which are necessary to the leading of the good
life; these rights are natural, preclsejg because they are its necessary condition.
Carolina:
l^Laskl, D^^mocracv in Crisis (Chapel HIU, North
19o3) , p. 215.
The University of North Carolina Press,
^^
Ibld . , pp. 216-17.
“Professor Laski and
^^Viuoted In, Roger H. koltau.
304.
larterly . XXI (July 1950), p.
tlcal Sclerwe," Poll tic
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The aim of the state to realize Individual freedom
la
the positive role of the government in providing equal

opportunities to the citizen*

For example^ compulsory edu*

cation Is not in this sense against the spirit of liberty,
because, "an illiterate man has no real means of performing
ttie

functions of citizenship."^®

Also, "it Is no use offer-

ing a man freedom of speech unless he has been trained to

articulate.

Furthermore, those who are physically and

mentally exhausted in the sheer effort to acquire dally
bread have little opportunities for freedom.

Thus the

government should see that nq member of the society

Is

de-

prived from enjoying the freedom due to economic reason.
Laskl's concept of freedom underwent a serious modification In the late twenties.

His early Insistence on posi-

tive freedom may appear to have given way to the utilitarian

view of liberty as a mere absence of restraint.

For example.

In the preface to the second edition of A Grammar

of

published in 1929, Laskl said In part, "In 1925

thought

I

folltloa

that liberty could most usefully be regarded as more than
a

negative thing.

take,

I am now convinced that this was a mis-

end the old view of It as an absence of restraint can

alone safeguard the personality of citizen."

The reason shy he took a seemingly negative concept of

^®Laski, Authority In the Aiodern State , p. 47.
^"^Laskl, Democracy In Crisis

,

p. 207.

»
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freedom is

a

question that requires careful study.

It may

strange that Laski^ w^o inclined closely towards

orthodox Marxism (which advocates a positive role of the
state at least in the early stt^e

of

control of the state)

had taken the position of believing the absence of restraint
as freedom.

Perhaps Laskl took the position of negative

freedom realizing that the kind of egalitarian society he

wished had proved to be too difficult to bring about due to
the opposition of the vested interests who were in control
of the state apparatus.

In closer scrutiny > it would be found that the negative

freedcm position he took at this period was different from
negative freedom in

a

Utilitarian sense.

He said in the

opening page of Liberty in the Modern State

,

”l mean by

liberty the absence of restraint upon the existence of those
social conditions which^ in modern civilization, are the

necessary guarantees of individual happiness.

Ills

Here it should be noted that the absence of restraint

did not apply to individual action, but to those social
conditions which were necessary for individual happiness*
Thus it was in agree msnt with his earlier view namely that

freedom was the system of conditions that enables the in-

dividual

to

attain self-realization.

The attempt to bring

about such social conditions should not be obstructed by

^^Laski, Liberty in the Modern State , p,

1
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the authority of a hostile government.

Laski may have

meant that there should not be ony outside restraint if
the working class should attempt to set up an egalitarian

society.

Also such a measure as compulsory education was

not contradictory to his argisnent which said that liberty
was an absence of restraint up>on the necessary social con*

ditions, since such a measure was to get rid of illiteracy
in order to

bring about the necessary social condition

(where everybody was highly informed and able to express
his view on daily political occurences).

Thus he could

say without contradiction that^ "a compulsory training of

mind is still compulsion.

It is a sacrifice of sons liber-

ty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases.

view of such an argument »

it

In

could be justly said that he

was not far away from his earlier position when he advocated

positive freedom.
However, as he leaned closer towards Marxian socialism,
he reasoned that the state in the capitalistic society was

perverted for the interests of a specific group,

and he

was, more or less, logically compelled to employ the concept of negative freedom to denounce the attempt of the

privileged class to oppose any major social reform, or

^ ^Ibid .,

p.

6.

-

argue
1919 Laski rejected this idea saying that to
class
any
of
that a government was perverted to the ends
within 8 state was, *to project into history a malignant
teleology from which it is, in no small degree, free.*
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their opposition
ture*

to

alter the basic legal and social struc-

The change In his conception of freedom could be more

readily understood in connection with his transition towards
Marxism*

Therefore,

I

would like to d isouss briefly why he

gradually adopted the socialistic view to preserve and maintain freedom and equality*
a

Further discussion of Laski as

socialist will be devoted to the following chapter*
Laski expressed his view that a society divided Into a

small number of rich and a large number of poor persona was
not adequate for the self-realization of the individual*

Where society Is divloed between the exploiters and exploited, there cannot be a genuine democratic government, because
the real meaning of the democratic government is the equal

weighing of Individual claims to happiness ty social institutions*^^

Tlius

he presumed that democracy cannot exist in

a capitalistic

society which denies economic equality*

a capitalistic

society, there Is a class with the power to

use the authority of the state for its Interests*

society Is

a

In

Such a

house divided and, in Laskl*8 words:

a wealthy class strives, inevitably,

to pro-

tect Its advantages at their maximum; and the poor
are driven to attempt their invasion as the only
way of enjoying their results* The state, therefore, Is compelled. If it seeks to realize Its ends,
so to organize Its activities as deliberately as
mitigate the consequences of this material Inequal1 ty *

* * *

For every improvement in eoucation, or health, or

228-29
^^Laski, Liberty In the Modem State , pp* 217,
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housing among tins poor leads to an increased
Intensity of demand for further concession a. They
realize the inadequacy of a social system which
does not relate proportionately the toll md the
gain of living. The passion for equality, in a
word, is a permanent feature of human nature.^”
By 1930 Laski conceded the practical difficulty of the
near absolute freedom shich he so ardently advocated at the
time »4ien he was a pluralist.

By this time, also, he admit-

ted the necessity to compromise freedom to authority in order
to reach a certain balance between the two.

Thus, about the

limit on freedom, Laski argued as follows:
We cannot, however, say that the right to
these freedoms is unlimited. The state must,
because its business is the preservation of
order, concern itself to see that the peace is
maintained. It is, therefore, entitled to say
that any utterance which directly incites to
immediate disorder is subject to penalty; and
that any association which embarks upon action
likely to threaten the maintenance of order shall,
also, be subject to penalty
Thus individual freedom must be limited when

imminent threat to the social order.

ti:e

re is an

However, too many

times the limitation of freedom has been employed for the

preservation of the unequal social order.

Although Laski

was very unhappy about this fact, once he saw the possi-

bility for the victory of the British Labor Party, he argued:
It /the British Labor Party/ is concerned,
if it can, to implement the socialist principles
for which it stands by the procedures of democratic consent; but granted that it receives the

^^Laskl, An Introduction to Politics , pp. 32-3.'
^^Ibid

#.

pp. 39-40.

.

61

authority of the electorate for Its programme.
It cannot allow the dissent of a minority, however vociferous and powerfyl, to stand in the
way of its achievement,

Such an argument as this runs quite contrary to his earlier
argument for the right of dissent If Individual conscience
tells him to do so.

Partisan sentiment seems to have cloud-

ed the scholarly objectivity of Laski,

Laski*s position

could be defended, if one insists that his early argument for
individual right was directed toward the theory of the Levi-

athan state rising across the Channel, and that the argument
quoted above -- was motivated from his sincere conviction
that programs put out by the Labor Party were the path to

freedom and equality.

But it is difficult to deny that

Laski became rather dogmatic in his belief.

It is highly

regrettable that Laski took such an attitude, since he was
the one who always warned us not to be d qgmatic in the field

of political belief.
It could also be assumed that the abandoniiient of his

pluralism in 1930s end the adoption of Marxian socialism
marked a new phase in Laski's political ideas.

Of course,

it is true that he became more dogmatic in his view of

history^ but he never completely abandoned the liberal

sentiment of his earlier thinking, and this distinguished
Laski from other more doctrinaire Marxists,

Iha StraUgy of Freedom (Harper
110*
& Brothers Publishers, New York: 1941), p.
2*fiaroie J.

,
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CHiiPTIiR V

SOCIi^LISM

U6K.1

OJ'

V/hen Luski was beginning

his study at Oxford, he was

already a member of the B’ablan Society.
time. It Is said,

But he was at tnat

at least as rnuoh a liberal

It should be also mentioned that Laskl

as a

at this

play any prominent or conspicuous role as

a

socialist.^

period did not

socialist.

He

was more moderate than militant In his political opinions.

Looking back In 1959, Laskl affirmed that he became

a

social-

ist partly due to the Influence of a great school master,
Mr. Pet an, and "something, too, was the outcome of a Jewish

upbringing, the sense It conferred of being treated dlffer_2

ently from other people end no obviously assignable cause."*'

but the most Important reason for his having become
ist seems to be the

a

social-

strong sense cf the Injustice he saw In

his contemporary world; "up to 1920,

I

think, as I look back,

that my socialism was above all the outcome of

injustice of things as they were...

a

sense of

."

Throughout his writings, he has a3>’eys been proud of

being a socialist.
his life.

His Idealism never dimmed throughout

Sometimes he was discouraged and other times he

seemed to have fallen into a deep sense of despair.

^Martin, op . olt .
^Laskl, "Why I am

^Ibld.

,

p. 6 0.

p.
a

But he

15.

Marxist," Natl on^ V. 148, p. 59.
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never comproul aed what he believed to be Juatlce under any
olroumstance*
Laekl, In a broad sonae, accepted the dialectical

materlallam

of Mar:}il8m*

It seems rather ironic that Laakl

took the dialectical materlallam of Marx, which was essen-

tially based on Hegel’s phi lose fhy which Laski hud been

refuting with his utmost efforts*

The dialectical method

had some advantage over the traditional method in explaining
the d evcloiJMsnt of history*

According to Engels, the tradi-

tional method dealt with the natural objects in Isolation
and repose, while the dialectical method comprehended things

in their essential oonneotion, conoaternati on, and motion*^

Laski seems to have employed this method in explaining past

history as demonstrated in one of his books, namely The Rise
of Liberalise *

The attempt to explain past ld.story based on this view

manifested itself as an economic interpretation of history*

According to this view, there are two basic factors in the
economic condition of any society which characterize the economic structure of this society.
(1)

The two basic factors are

the material forces of production and

nooessaxy to utilise

ttie

(2)

the knowledge

material forces of production.

The

conditions of production give rise to certain relations of

production in order to utilize these conditions of production

^Frederick Engels, Socialism Utopi^i and S cientific
oi-<t4*
(Loiidon. Ueorge Allen ic Unw in, 19l>0) , pp*
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efficiently.

The relatione of production depend upon the

oonditioKks of product Ion

production in
tical

,

.

y

that

le

to eay^

liie

relations of

oapitalletic eoclety, such ts legal, poli-

a

educat ic»nal, and religious institutions, are

a

mere superstructure of the conditions of production.
At certain stages of econojalc developrnent, according
to ifiarxiam, the material forces of production oorao into

conflict with relations of production; the forces of pro-

duction outgrow the relations of production.
diction

is

Such contra-

the inherent attributes of a capitalistic system

according to Marxism.

This contradiction stems from the

fact that, in the oapitallstie economic system, the modes
of production are socialized In a sense that they are used
by a society as a whole for the purpose of production, while
they
a

a re

in practice owned by individual oopltallsta.

Only

violent means of revolution can bring a new harmony between

the out Jointed conditions of prod’.2Ctlon and the relations
of productlcn, since those who own the means of production

never voluntarily abdicate their privileges.
Leski accepted this concept of the economic interpretation of history in a broad sense, thereby attempting to explain

til

e

development of history based on the economic

conditions of

a

given time.

For example, "he saw the rise

of liberalism in Europe as a result of the Reformation and

the

,

econanlc and subsequently political, of
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t>ouz*g6ol slo

•

book vcFlbbon In

mannox* la Tho Rla#

bfail.8

of Llberaliam as mentioned briefly above.
On the subject of historioal meterlallam, Laakl felt

that the Marxian philosophy of history was the Insistence
that the primary motive force which caused social changes
was the system of economic production.

All the other forms

of effort would adjust themselves to the economic needs,

whether consciously or unconsciously.
view in

a

In accepting this

broad sense, Laskl Interpreted historical mater-

ialism as followsi
Nor does it /economic interpretation of history/ insist that economic conditions are the sole cause of
change; it merely argues that they are its main
cause. Roughly speaking, it is an argument to the
effect that man's situation is the preceptor of
his duty, and that in that situation economic elements are paramount simply because the means of
life are the first thing to which men must pay
attention.”
Here, one example of Laski's attempt to soften the Marxist

dogma could be noticed.
a

In Communism. Laski warned against

dogmatic attempt which tried to interpret all historical

development based solely upon economic conditions saying,
**the

communist reliance upon a kind of natural law in social

revolution leads him seriously to underestimate the power of

®K. Callard, "The Heart and Mind of Harold Laskl",
The Canad ian Journal of Economics and Political Science , XX
No. ^ rSay 1954), p. ^4V.

^Laskif Communism , New York, 1927, p.

77.'
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forces which are of a non-econondc

Then he went on

to argue that:

The degree to which nationalism, for Instance,
will resist economic necessity is remarkable* • • •
An Jinglish working-man ought, doubtless, to feel
that he has more in common with the French or
German worker than with the Kngllsh capitalist*
The fact remains that, in general, he gives no
sign of such feeling*”

Although Las Id. did not accept the economic interpretation of history literally, he acknowledged the Importance of
economic relations on the other social institutions, especially on the nature of government,

as

shown when he said,

"there is no department of human life in which the governing

ideas and Institutions will not be found, upon examination,

to be largely a reflection of a given set of economic conditions*"®

By 1931 Laski leaned more closely towards the

orthodox theory of Marxism, and held the view that the character of any particular state would be determined by the

ec^omic system*

In a society where extreme economic in-

equality prevails, those who control the economic power

would command the legal systems for their own class interests*
The

state, in such circumstances, would not

act to promote

the general well-being of a community, but for the interests

*^

lbid *

,

p.

88*

Qlbld ** pp* 88 ff*
^Ibld*

t

p* 78*
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of the dominant economic group.
that

Here hia early insistence

the government ia not consciously perverted to the

ends of any class, end that so to argue is to project into

history

a

malignant teleology from which it is, in no small

degree free,

has been greatly modified.

10

Along with historical materialism, Marx developed the
theory of surplus value in order to explain the phenomenon
of exploitation in a capitalistic system.

Marx asserted

that the socially necessary labor power embodied in commodities was the sole determinant of their value.

The surplus

value was the difference between what workers receive in order
to subsist and what is totally derived from what they have

created.

Thus Marx contented that the workers actually

created more value than they were paid.

Marx further reduced

capital as the product of past labor, and asserted that workers alone produce all the values.

Laski did not accept this theory of surplus value as

being valid as theory:
I do not myself believe that the Marxian theory of
value has, despite all the refinements of its advocates, stood the test of time. It was in its day
a fair answer to the Ricardian school; but with the
progress of economic doctrine its rehabilitation is
no longer seriously possible. But it is v/orthwhlle
to note that its theoretic inadequacies neither
stood, nor are likely to sUnd, in the way of its
acceptance by most of those who feel bitterly and
suffer from the inadequacies of our present economic

10 See above, p. 56.

•
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arrangement
Thus, although Laskl did not take the theory of eurplut

value too seriously In

much credit

a

to It In the

appeals to {the poor) as

theoretical sense, he accorded
sense that **liarx'8 theory of value
a

simple and direct explanation of

his distressed condition..#

He did not underestimate

the propaganda value of the theory.
It was also the contention of Marx that as long as the

Institution of private property remained, the surplus value
would be pocketed by the bourgeois

class, and the class

struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat would
be Inevitable.

Further Marx asserted that as the capital-

ist system developed further, the wealth would be concentrated Into the hands of fewer rich, and the misery of the poor

would be Intensified.

Then the proletariat would grow class

conscious and It would. In the end, over-throw the capitalist

system by violent means, because the bourgeois class would
not abdicate their privileges voluntarily.
Laskl also viewed the history of capitalism as the

history of a relentless defense of each phase of the rights
of property; they were always defended without regard to

Justice.

He

thou^t that there might be periods

of conces-

sion by the bourgeois class, as In an epoch of expanding

^^Laskl, "Marxism after Fifty Years", Current History ,
XXXVIl, (March 1933), p. 692.
^^Ibld.
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tr&de, but onoe any vital point was affected by the workers'

demands, they were met, as in the French Kevolution, by armed

resistance
Laski saw the rise of fascism in this light; when the

foundation of capitalism was tnreatened by the demands of
workers, and when the oapitel ists were unable to make major
economic concessions in

a

time of economic contraction, they

turned to the outlaws to defend their economic privileges:
The essence of fascism, whether in its German or
its Italian form, is the use of the outlaw by
the privileged to defend themselves against the
demand of the masses for justice* That demand
is made when the contraction of the economic system
brings out the innerent contradiction between the
forces of production and its relations *^^

Hence, he argued during World War II, unless capitalism was

transformed to a socialistic economic order, "we shall find
ourselves confronted by the precieely the same grim issues
about which we are fitting today

***^®

This argument of

Laski seems to be an- over*simplifi cation of the causes which

contributed to the rise of fascism; he seems to have underestimated such factors as the traditional Prussian militarism,
the evil genius

erf*

Hitler, the influence of Romanticism which

fermented such a fanatic nationalism in Germany, and the

effect of the Peace of Versailles, along with the threat of

^^ Ibid ,

,

p.

693.

^^Laskl, "Revolution by Consent", Nation , V. 167,
(September lb, 1943), p. 349*

^^Ibid.
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communism, wtolch all contributed to the rise of fascism*
In his arg\mient, Laski also seems to have neglected the

flexibilities of a free society, which could adjust itself to the changing demands of time; he overlooked the

possibility of that the capitalistic society could take

mere responsibility for the social end economic welfare
of its members within the framework of a free and democratic political system*

Although Laski himself wished to see the basic reform

brought about by peaceful means, he was always skeptical
about the possibility of those property holders making a
major concession voluntarily, and he constantly warned of
the outbreak of revolution unless serious popular grievances

were remedied by legal means*
and said once;

**1

Laski realized the difficulty

have been arguing that, when the poli-

tical democracy seeks to transfer (the instruments of

production) to the community, the capitalist class will,
if it can, use the state power to supress democratic insti-

tutions*"^^

So he implied that a violent revolution might

be inevitable*
La ski's attitude was understood

and reported by some

of the conservative papers in England as one advocating a

violent revolution*

This resulted in the famous Libel Case

brought by Laski against the Newark Advertiser and South

^^Laskl, The State in Theory and Practice ,

p.

123
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Notts gazette In 1946.

Laekl lost the case despite hit

gallant defense that what he was insisting on was^ *wlth
the end of war, if the reform were not brought about by

constitutional means, there was danger of drifting toward

violence and revolution
Lastcl

was against the use of violent means towards

social reform, because, along with many other reasons, such
a violent upheaval did not necessarily contain an a priori

assurance that it would produce an Idyllic society as envisaged by Marx.

According to La ski:

Violence on the grand scale. In fact, so far from
providing an avenue to communism, would be the one
kind of existence In which t^ impulse demanded by
a communist society would have no hope of emergence.
For the condition of communism Is the restraint of
exactly those appetites which violence releases; and
the coramunlBt had nowhere shown how this difficulty
can be met except by affirming ^at dictatorship will
destroy thera.^®
Laskl expressed a deep skepticism concerning the over-

simplified Marxian dogma which contended that, after the

proletariat revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat
would be followed
that there was

a

l?y

a

Laskl argued

classless society.

great over -simplification of the historical
"the struggle for Justice Is not ended

process In Marxism;

by the creation of

a

classless society.

Nor will the observer

be tempted to admit. If he can maintain some measure of ob-

^’^"Laskl Libel Case", Nation . V. 163

1946), p. 714.
18
Laskl, Communism , p. 174.

(December 21,
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Jectlvity, that the victory of the proletariat is any

more certain than the victory of men like Napoleon or
Mueeollni*** •* 19 Laaki'a disagreement with Marx on this

subject was conspicuous when Laskl said that:
Nor is it easy to see why Marx* view of the communist state should be accepted. If the revolution he
foresaw became universal ^ there is no inherent reason why the result should be the kind of society he
desired. «• • While economic classes might , by hypothesis, disappear, another form of class rule, that
of doctrinal aristocracy, for example, might take
its place. The poison of power is notorious, and
it is difficult to see why communists should be
held Immune from its toxins. 20
Unlike Marx, Laski did not exclude the possibility of

compromise between the two classes, although he admitted
that the chances for such a compromise were extremely slim.

Laski acknowledged the possibility of some alternatives to

the violent revolution, namely a revolution by consent.
This very attitude distinguished him from the deterministic

dogma of orthodox Mancism.

Laskl*6 insistence on revolution

by consent was an argument much qualified when it was to
be applied In practice:

peaceful change

of

it was his firm belief that the

the fundamental political and economic

institutions was of utmost difficulty in its nature, and if
it is possible, it would be carried out most likely in a

state like i*ngla nd where the people had been accustomed to

^^Laskl, **Marxism after Fifty Years,**, p. 695.

^^Laskl, Communism , p. 66.
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the representative Institutlone for a long period of time,

and Ythere there had been also a long period of liberal
tradition*
On the nature of the state, Laskl'a view waa similar

to that of Marx, who believed that the state In

capital-

a

istic society was an organ whose pxlmex^ purpose wes to

suppress and exploit economically weak ones.

Such

a

state

aimed at the creation and maintenance of an order In order
to legalize and enable economic exploitation.

In Laskl's

opinion,
what occurs In any state where there are great
material differences between classes Is simply
a perversion of the end of the state to the
Interests of the rich. Their power oompells
the agents of the state to make their wishes
the first object of consideration. Their conception of good insensibly pervades the mental
climate of administration. They dominate the
machinery of the state. By justice they mean
the satisfaction of their demands, by lessons
of history tlicy mean the deposit of their experience...

Than Laskl went on to argua that the Greek city-state
was biased against slaves, the Koman empire against the slave
and the poor.

States In the medieval world were biased In

favor of the owners of landed property.

Since the industrial

revolution, the state has been biased in ^avor of the owners
of the Instruments of production as against those who have

nothing tut their labor power to aell.^^

Then he proceeded

^^Laskl, Ln Introduction to Politics , pp. 43-44.
Laskl, The btate In Theory and Practice

,

p.

87.
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to concluJ e that the state could never be neutral in any

society where there were class distinctions.

In Lsald-'a

opinion, the state was merely a coercive power used to

protect the system of rights and duties of one process of
economic relationship from invasion by another class

karxlan philosophy is dominated by
toric let attitude combined with

a

a

deep rooted his-

rigid determinism.

There-

fore it is not strange that Laski, whose approach to political

problems was prlrnsrlly pragmatic, did not accept the tourxlst

dogma, although his zeal for the realization of egalitarian
society made him acopt the Marxian view in a broad sense.
He was in favor of government control of those industries,

such as the mechanism of national credit, coal and electric
power, transport, and the ownership of lend, which were vital

to the national life#^^

'fhe

transformation of such key in-

dustries should be brou^t about by peaceful means,

fthen

the British Labor Barty won the general election of 1945,

La ski exclaimed that "the Labor Party in their name /the

name

of the

people/ will seek to make a revolution by consent.

It will try to build the socialist commonwealth for the

creation of which it has a decisive mandate
of constitutional democracy*"

^ ^Ibid

. ,

p*

ty the

process

25

100.

^^Laskl, "Revolution by Consent", Nation ,

p. 552.

^^Laskl, "Great Britain* goes Socialist", Nation , V.
161, (August 4, 1945), p. 98.
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During Acrid Aar II » Laski alto expressed. In hit
open letter to the American students, the hope and possibility, however slim it might be, of revolution by consent

under the leadership of President Roosevelt

in America.

He

believed tnat the revolutionary character of the war made
the fundamental change of the social institutions easier

then before:
The first is that war itself has compelled profound
changes and so induced a mood in the nation that is
prepared for great experiment. Crisis always breaks
the cake of custcKn; md it is folly not to take advantage of the mood while it lasts.^^

Also to Laski, the mass of people seemed to be more willing
and able to use their political power to bring about the

basic social reform.

Laski also hoped that those who poss-

ess the instruments of production would learn in due time

that, to live in peace, the sharp class distinctions had to

disappear.

27

^®Laski, "Revolution by Consent", Nation,

p.

^"^Laski, The Strategy of Freedom (New York:
& Bros., 1941), pp. 9^-lOU.

560.
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CHiwPTER VI

COMCLU&IOM

As h& s boen mentioned above ^ i^aakl began bla career as
a proponent of ardent liberalism,

in the earlier period of

his writing he devoted hla utmost efforts to meeting the

challenge of totalitarian philosophy; his arguments for

pluralism have to
text*

be

appreciated, therefore. In this con-

It is true that his argument lacked a logical con-

sistency at tlme^ but, to the writer of this paper. It seems
to be a realistic modification of his view as he faced newer

problems rather than the lack of scholarly Insist*
He started his academic life as an ardent advocate of

Individual right and freedom, and ended up as

a

proponent

of socialism In order to secure common^good for the people
by setting up a certain standard below which nobody should
fall*

However, this diange of outlook did not conflict with

his aim to maximize Individual happiness; It should bo noted

that It has been the general trend of the Western liberalism

which adopted

a

more positive role of government for the pro-

motion of public Interests*
In his argument for pluralism, granted that his aim for
the preservation of individual freedom was noble, he seems
to have failed to

explain how the necessary coordination was

many
to be achieved among the various Institutions, namely

conflicting Interest groups whose functions could impinge
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upon on© another.

Such

a

failure, as a result, loft enough

roan to be criticized by such an unsparing critic as Herbert
Deane, who pointed out that the pluralism of LasWl "loaves
unsolved the basic problem •• who Is to decide when the acti-

vities of the church cease to be of concern to itself and
begin to affect persons outside the group.

Granting the

practical Inadequacy of pluralism, we should not fall to

understand that the main aim of his argument was to prevent
the state from turning Into a

false god by setting up the

state as superior and indifferent to its component indivi-

duals

.

At times, when Laskl discussed the nature of the state,
his arguiuent pertaining to the aim of the state seems to

merge with th

d;

of the idealism which he was mainly attacking;

the influence of T. H. Green on Laskl in this respect cannot

be Ignored.

But

it was Green as a founder of Oxford Liberal-

ism rather than as a successor of German idealism who influ-

enced Laskl.

With all the likeness to idealism In his dis-

cussion of the aim of the state, the method he proposed to
implement the aim of the state was almost diametrically
opposed to that of idealism, that is to say, his approach
was largely pragmatic.

Even after he had adopted a near-

Marxist view, he was vlolertOy opposed to any restriction of

^Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laskl , p. 27.

freedom of thought.

To Laeki,

this 1.8 not 8 static worlds and there la no means
of making it so. Curiosity^ discovery, invention,
all of these Jeopardise by their nature the foundation of any society to which their results are
denied admission. Toleration is therefore not merely
desirable in itself, tut also politically wise, because no other atmosphere of activity offers the
assurance of peaceful adjustment.*
It was In 1941, when many branded him an orthodox

Marxist, that Laaki said himself, "understanding comes to

those only who have been permitted to examine without penalty the clash of ideas in

tlie

market place.

If their free

examination Is denied, the price is always paid in an easy

acceptance of naive dogma.

If the toleration of a differ-

ent belief is a main attribute of liberalism, and if that

toleration has been denied in Soviet Russia, it could safely
be said that

Laski has been in the camp of liberals rather

than in that of doctrinaire Marxism.

with Marxism,

It

If Laski sympathized

was mainly by IderitifVlng himself with the

humanitarian aspect of Marxism.

And if he were a Marxist,

at least he was a •Marxist with a difference" as one of his

biographers mentioned.

4

^Laski, Liberty in the Modem State ,
^Laskl, The Strategy of Freed an ,

p.

p.

280.

14.

^Martin, Harold J^ski . p. 81 f.
Iia8ki*8 argument
Up, Martin also says ^n tiie same book that,
he was a
test
final
might be derived from Marx, but at the
If he was
Lenin.
follower of William Morris rather than of
put it,
Levy
a Marxist it was because, as his friend Louis
and
humanist,*
*the socialism of Karl Marx was essentially
emphawho
Jeures, Blum, and Harold Laski were all socialists

7©

Naturally, Laskl waa oppoaed to auoh a almple formula
aa that it waa neoeeaary to build a email revolutionary

party which would, in
ment
iat*

tiie

civil war and set

final resort, overthrow a govern*
\jp

& dictatorehip of the proletar-

In spite of his often expressed diatruat of the

representative institution , an attempt to resort to
means seemed rather immature to Laski, especially in

violent

a
a

country

like IJ*ngland which has a long period of liberal tradition.®

Although Laski did not approve

of

the method which the

Bolshevik! had employed for their ascendence to power, Laski
more often than not ex {re seed his sympathy with the Soviet
Union, especially with its planned econoniy*

Looking back on

the political ideas of Laski in the longer perspective, "it
is true that Laski traveled all the way from an individual-

ist propounding the theories of pluralist society to a near-

Marxist prepared to overlook the evils of totalitarian means
for the sake of its gains*"®

How far Laski was willing to

sacrifice individual freedom for the realization of an

egalitarian society is not certain, but^ as the abandonment

sized 'this h\aman side of Marxism' and linked 'the inventor
of scientific socialism with the main current of French
Hevolutlonary thought*' Like i^^llllam Morris, he held^
that socialism anc felioftship are the same thing.** *
p* 256*

®Ibid *

*

p*

82*

®0* L* MethSf Harold

Harolc Laski Institute
p* 7*
tlon No* 27 ) ,

of

Revisited (Ahmedabad, India:
Foil t leal t>cience, 1960, iHablioa-
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of pluralism shows rather clearly, he was ready
to make some

concessions In the realm of Individual freedom and rights.

Granted that It was from his sincere desire to disseminate
the opportunities of self-realisation on a wider basis,
still

It

true that he recoiled to some degree from the position

is

of an Individualist In favor of a greater degree of collect-

ivism.

Thus La ski, disapproving of the dictatorial method

employed by the Soviet regime, praised the Russian revolution
as the Inheritor of the French Revolution, and believed that.

In the long run, freedom would prevail In Russia.

In 1846 Laskl said. In praise of planned economy, "free

enterprise and the market economy mean war; socialism and
planned eoonony mean peace.
or we must

perish.

n7

Vie

must plan our civilization

With so much emphasis on planned

economy. It Is not so clear how far he was willing to sacrifice Individual liberty and other political safeguards for
the preservation of democracy, because planned economy may

well lead to political collectivism.

The dilemma was, as

put by Mr. Metha, who was once a student under Professor

Laskl and Indian Ambassador to the United States, "by re-

jecting both the democratic way and the Communist method,

he had nothing to fall back upon since he failed to evolve
an alternative In place

of

the means

he

rejected.

Laskl, "Plan or Perish", The Ration . CIAI (December
16, 1946), p. 661.
®0. L. Metha, 0£. clt

. .

p.

13.
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The dilemna of l^askl aeena, to the writer of this

paper, to have originated from his over-almpllficatlcti of
the western economic system, especially Its flexibility.

It

has been evidenced since the conclusion of World War II that,
through the Institutions of representative government, especially in England, much social legislation has become
effective loading towards the goal of a welfare state.

For

example, since 1945, the British society has undergone such
a change tliat the working-class In England appears to have

accepted the Institutions

of

representative democracy as

a means of improving its lot.

The acceptance of welfare-

state philosophy by the British Conservative Farty seems

to have made the Labor Party less

a

ttractlve to the eyes

of working class people as evidenced by the successive

conservative victories In the Parliamentary elections.

It

Is doubtful, but speculated by the writer of this paper,
that If Laskl lived today, he might have regained some of

his confidence In the flexibility and capacity of democratic

representative Institutions as

a

means of realizing Indivi-

dual happiness through peaceful means.

Looking backward, ton years after his death, we can
see some of his weakness; ho seems to have exaggerated his

capacity to Influence practical politics by writing pamphlets
and making speeches.

wrong.

"As a polltlcan Harold set his sights

He did not recognize the limitations of his method,

nor realize that he could not successfully combine the role

.
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of eminent grace with that of popular leader."®

But as a

teacher he excelled the others In the world of learning.At times. It la regretted that he failed to reach scholarly

maturity by devoting much of hla time and energy to partisan
politics.

Perhaps It Is txue that he "neglected those periods

of lonely thought out of which creative Ideas spring,"^® but

It should be remembered that, "Laakl was one of the few teachers who sought to bring political

science to earth, to relate

political concept to economic trends, and yet hitch the wagon
to the

star.”

as he was so successful and Influential as

a teacher. It said that hundreds of letters of sorrow and

gratitude poured In, not only from i^ngland, but also from
all over the world, upon the news of his unexpected death
In 1960.^^

In his political thinking. If La ski advocated a revo-

lution, It was a theory In the Lockean-Jefferaonlan rather
than Marxian sense.

Therefore, to the writer of this paper.

It seems to be unfair for one to attempt to build him Into
a

gaulelter commissar; on the contrary, his Influence as a

liberal democrat, at least throughout most of his lifetime,

with the rich heritage of liberal faith, seems to have
blocked the Inroads of revolutionary communism.

®Martln, Harold Laskl

.

p. 248.

^Q lbld .. p. 247.
^^0. L. Metha,

Martin,

clt

.

p.

clt .. p. 249.

23.

What he

83 •

teaches us today Is the lesson thit democracy does not mean

mere maintenance

of

the status quo, but continual trans-

formation of our society to satisfy the basic needs of its
Individual members through peaceful and constitutional

means*

Be also warns us that we must constantly guard

against the danger of any dogna, because it is an ob-

struction to progress*

i^bove

all, the greatest lesson

one can get from his teaching is that, as he so consistently

insisted, the individual should be an end in itself, but

never a means toward other ends however noble they may
appear*
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